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Abstract 
Avian influenza H5N1 represents one of the most researched viruses in laboratories world-wide in 
recent times with regards to its epidemiology, ecology, biology and geography. The virus has caused 
409 human cases and 256 human fatalities to date. Some laboratory activities and other lab related 
works predispose certain workers to exposure to this virus. In this work, we assessed the effect of 
exposure of HPAI infective allantoic fluid to ultraviolet rays for between 15 and 180 minutes. No 
significant difference was found between the unexposed and exposed viruses. The ability of the 
virus to haemagglutinate chicken red blood cells, the haemagglutination titre and its pathogenicity 
in embryonating eggs did not change despite this prolong exposure to UV-light.  We call for caution 
in the handling of HPAI viruses in laboratory inside the microbiological safety cabinet despite 
sterilization using UV-light. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Avian influenza is a very important 
zoonotic and trans-boundary animal 
disease. In recent times, the highly 
pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 (HPAI 
H5N1) has been in the centre of attention 
and activities of most viral research 
laboratories world widely. This is not 
unconnected with the recent spread (1996 
to date) of the virus in many countries and 
the trans-boundary cum zoonotic 
potentials held by the avian influenza  
 
H5N1 virus. The virus has spread in over 
fifty countries and linked to the death of 
more than 500 million birds of different 
species. To date, four hundred and nine 
(409) number of human infections and two 
hundred and fifty-six (256) human 
fatalities has been recorded (1).  
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While the majority of the countries that 
has been affected from western countries 
have got the capacity to easily manage and 
control the infection using standardized 
laboratory procedures, achievable policies 
and management practices, affected 
countries in developing economies and 
those country in transition still battle with 
the ability to cope with effective 
diagnoses, management and control (2, 3). 
These latter groups of countries 
sometimes grapple with inadequate 
laboratory facilities/expertise and often 
improvise for equipment and materials.  
Ultra-violet (UV) irradiation is a proven 
germicidal widely used in many research 
laboratories. A survey of literatures 
showed that although UV irradiation has 
been assessed in its ability to inactivate 
viral, protozoan and bacteria organisms 
including Escherichia coli (4), Sendai virus 
(5), Polio virus and Adenovirus (6), 
Mycobacterium avium subspp. 
paratuberculosis (7), and protozoans (8), 
none has been documented with regards 
to avian influenza viruses. 
The manufacturers of most 
microbiological safety cabinet instruct that 
the regular assessment of the UV 
efficiency on work surface be carried out 
using UV light meter, and several 
scientists are aware of the need to replace 
the UV tube should the intensity falls 
below the adequate requirement (for 
example 40 microwatts per square 
centimeter at a wavelength of 253.5 x 10-
9m) (The Baker Company, Sanford ME, 
www.bakerco.com), however, a number of 
researchers in low income food deficient 
countries (LIFDC) tend to assume that a 
relatively new cabinet should have an 
efficient UV system.  
A recent assessment of a set of final year 
Medical Laboratory Science (virology 
option) students and other spectrum of 
research scientists revealed that over 80% 
believed that the UV rays are able to 
attenuate/kill any virus after some long 
period of exposure. Such believe is carried 
into the work environment and this 
sometimes unwittingly predispose many 
researchers to potential hazards associated 
with undue/unprotected exposure to 
HPAI H5N1 virus through working in the 
cabinet, since the aerosolized virus may 
remain for some time in the cabinet. 
Technicians, service personnel and 
laboratory cleaning staff are at similar risk 
in the course of performing their routine 
duties. 
This work therefore aims at investigating 
the potential dangers held by the residual 
avian influenza H5N1 virus following its 
manipulation in the biological safety 
cabinets despite extended periods of 
exposure to ultra-violet radiation.   
Materials and Methods 
Three candidate H5N1 HPAI viruses were 
selected from the isolate bank (-70oC) and 
allow to thaw on wet ice inside a 
microbiological safety cabinet 
(SterilGARD® III Advance, The Baker 
Company, Sanford ME, 
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www.bakerco.com). The isolates have 
been characterized using standardized 
methods as previously reported (9). 
Briefly described, all un-contaminated 
allantoic fluids (ALF) arising from 
inoculation of 20% tissue samples were 
spot tested by haemagglutination test; the 
chorio-allantoic membrane (CAM) of 
positive harvest were further prepared 
and tested by agar-gel immuno-diffusion 
(AGID) to detect influenza A group 
antigen. α-haemagglutination test was 
conducted to determine the virus subtype. 
For further confirmation, a cascade-type 
molecular analysis was performed starting 
with the M-gene. Every positive result for 
M-gene was subjected to an RT-PCR for 
haemagglutinin gene of subtypes H5 and 
H7. Every positive HA result was 
confirmed for N1 by RT-PCR. The primers 
used are listed in Table 1. 
The haemagglutination titres of all the 
viruses were determined afresh using 
standardized protocol (9). 200µl of each 
virus sample was inoculated into five 9-
day-old embryonating chicken eggs (ECE) 
and incubated at 37oC. The chicken 
embryos were monitored for mortality 
through candling. All dead eggs were 
chilled at 4oC, aseptically opened and the 
ALFs tested for haemagglutinating 
activities and plated on blood agar to 
exclude bacteria contamination.  Fresh 
ALF was harvested from each of the 
sample for experimental purposes. 
Exposure to UV-light and inoculation 
Five pieces each of a new set of 9-day-old 
ECE were grouped based on assigned 
timing (0minute, 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 
60 minutes, 120 minutes and 180 minutes). 
All eggs were properly marked and 
disinfected using 70% ethanol. Freshly 
harvested ALF were aliquoted and stored 
at -20oC. Portions of aliquots were placed 
on wet ice and exposed to UV- irradiation 
for the time previously assigned. Another 
portion was left unexposed to UV-light 
and kept at -20oC.  
At the end of each assigned time, 200µl of 
exposed and unexposed aliquots with the 
same timing were inoculated through the 
allantoic route into the marked 9-day-old 
ECE and sealed with wax. All eggs were 
incubated at 37oC and monitored for 
mortality as previously described above. 
Haemagglutinating ability of the exposed 
and unexposed ALF arising from the 
experiment was tested for using the 
appropriate procedure. Simply described, 
about 10-20µl of the ALF was mixed with 
about 20µl of c-RBC on a sterile white 
porcelain, gently rocked and observed for 
haemagglutination after about 2-3 
minutes.  
Portions of all the ALFs were taken for the 
determination of haemagglutinating titre 
post- exposure to UV-light. All ALF titres 
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were determined using standardized 
procedure (9).  
Diagnostic PCR was conducted to 
determine whether the exposure to 
ultraviolet rays has had significant effect 
on the amplicon sizes of the virus samples. 
  
Results 
No significant difference exists between 
the viruses exposed to ultraviolet 
irradiation at 95% CI (P value =0.3118). 
The exposure to UV-light does not seem to 
have any effect on the HPAI H5N1 virus 
ability to haemagglutinate c-RBC, 
pathogenicity in eggs and 
haemagglutination titre (Tables 2-5). 
However, the unexposed inoculum 
appears to have increasing titre with 
longer period of maintenance in the -20oC 
freezer. The exposure to UV-light does not 
seem to have any effect on the amplicon 




TABLE 1:  H-GENE AND M-GENE PRIMERS USED IN THE STUDY 
 
 
H forward   5’-CCT CCA GAR TAT GCM TAY AAA ATT GTC-3’ 
 
                                        H reverse    5’-TAC CAA CCG TCT ACC ATK CCY-3’ 
 
                                        M forward   5’-AGA TGA GTC TTC TAA CCG AGG TCG-3’ 
 




TABLE 2:  PRE-EXPERIMENTATION VIRUS ISOLATES CHARACTERISTICS. 
 
Passage  Ability to 
haemagglutinate 
10% c-RBC 
HA Titre at passage 







07/415 100% 5 100% HPAI (H5N1) 
07/456B 100% 4 100% HPAI (H5N1) 
07/439B 100% 5 100% HPAI (H5N1) 
 
 
TABLE 3:  PATHOGENICITY OF INOCULUM  (P2)  IN EMBRYONATING CHICKEN 
EGGS POST EXPOSURE TO UV-LIGHT. 
 
Result of pathogenicity in chicken embryo 48 hours after inoculation 
Virus isolate 15minutes 30minutes 60 minutes 120 minutes 180 minutes 
07/456B exposed 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
07/415 exposed 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
07/439B exposed 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Result of pathogenicity (Unexposed) 
07/456B unexposed 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
07/415 unexposed 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
07/439B unexposed 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Between 50 and 100% of all embryo die within 24 hours and all embryo die within 48 hours. P2= Passage level 2. 
 
 
TABLE 4: HAEMAGGLUTINATION TEST OF ALLANTOIC FLUIDS FROM EMBRYONATING CHICKEN 
EGGS POST-EXPOSURE OF INOCULUM TO UV-LIGHT. 
 
Result of HA after Exposure 
Virus Unexposed 15minutes 30 minutes 60 minutes 120 minutes 180 minutes 
07/456B 3/3 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 
07/415 3/3 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 
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07/439B 3/3 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 5/5 (100%) 
Results indicate complete haemagglutination of all tested and control samples 
TABLE 5: HAEMAGGLUTINATION TITRE OF ALLANTOIC FLUIDS FROM EMBRYONATING CHICKEN 
EGGS POST-EXPOSURE OF INOCULUM TO UV-LIGHT. 
 
Result of HA titre after UV Exposure P3 (all results in Log2) 
Virus isolate 15minutes 30 minutes 60 minutes 120 minutes 180 minutes 
07/456B 7 6 5 7 6 
07/415 4 4 4 8 5 
07/439B 6 7 7 7 5 
Result of HA titres (Unexposed) P3 
07/456B 4 5 6   
07/415 4 5 6   
07/439B 5 5 8   
P3= Passage level 3 
 
Discussion 
Our assessment of the effect of the UV-
light rays on virus haemagglutinability, 
haemagglutination titre, pathogenicity in  
embryonating chicken eggs and amplicon 
sizes has shown that the virus seem 
unaffected by UV-rays. This conflicts with 
the report of other workers with regards  
 
to other viruses affected by UV-light (5, 6).  
Lowy and co-workers (10) have similarly 
agreed that gamma irradiation rather that 
UV irradiation is more effective in 
penetrating through most biological and 




FIGURE 1. AMPLICON SIZE OF THE DIFFERENT SAMPLES ANALYZED FOLLOWING EXPOSURE OF THE 
INFECTIVE ALLANTOIC FLUIDS TO UV RAYS. 
 
                                       1       2     3    4      5       6     7       8      9    10    11   12     13    14 
                                  
                                         15    16    17    18    19    20   21   22    23    24    25    26 
 
1= 07/456B (60mins, E), 2= 07/456B (P2), 3= 07/149 (Newcastle isolate), 4= 07/439B (60mins, U), 5= 07/439B (15mins, 
E), 6= 07/456B (15mins, E), 7=07/456B (15mins, U), 8= 07/439B (P2), 9= 07/456B (30mins, U),  10= 07/456B (60mins, 
U), 11= 07/439B (30mins, E), 12= 07/439B (15mins, U), 13= 07/439B (180mins, E), 14= 07/640 (Newcastle isolate), 15= 
07/415 ( 15mins, E), 16= 07/415 (120mins, E), 17= 07/156 (Newcastle isolate), 18= 07/415 ( 60mins, E), 19= 07/456B 
(120mins, E), 20= 07/415 ( 30mins, E), 21= 07/415 ( 180mins, E), 22= 07/456B (180mins, E), 23= negative control, 24=  
07/456B (30mins, E), 25= 07/439B (120mins, E), 26= 07/415 (60mins, U). 
E=Exposed to UV-light; U =Unexposed to UV-Light. 
 
The lack of penetrating power of UV light 
through the virus may therefore explain 
why the virus are not inactivated by the 
UV-rays despite prolong exposure.  
Although, we are aware that the degree of 
thickness of the glass container holding 
the aliquots may to some extent serve as 
barrier to penetration of UV light, we 
ensure the usage of containers with thin 
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walls (≈1mm thickness) as it will be 
unethical to expose the naked virus to the  
environment for such long time in the 
safety cabinet. However, there is no 
difference in virus characteristics despite 
the wide disparity in exposure time (30 
minutes up to 180 minutes). 
 
Despite our inability to carry out animal 
infection assessment study using the 
exposed virus due to limitations of animal 
experimentation facilities, it is our strong 
opinion that the virus may still be able to 
cause pathogenicity in live chicken 
comparable to the initial field isolates.  
This area of study will need further 
investigation. 
 
The observed increasing titre recorded in 
the unexposed inoculum (Table 4) may be 
as a result of on-going virus activity. 
Webster and co-workers (9) has indicated 
that the virus is unstable and may have 
increasing activity if kept at -20oC for a 
relatively long time. We therefore affirmed 
the call for caution in the handling of 
H5N1 influenza viruses especially on wet 
ice.   
Our opinion survey of virology students 
and other laboratory staff suggested that 
43% have good knowledge, 52% have fair 
knowledge while 5% have poor 
knowledge of UV rays. Although 93% 
agreed that it will attenuate/kill bacteria, 
only 80% believed that it will 
attenuate/kill viruses, however two 
individuals believed that encapsulated 
bacteria may not be affected and four 
persons agreed that not all viruses may be 
affected by UV rays. 74% of the 
respondents claimed to have knowledge 
of depreciation in the effectiveness of UV 
rays over long period of usage time. 
However, none seem to be sure of whether 
the UV-rays will inactivate the H5N1 
virus. This revealed that virology staff is at 
high risk of infection with agent like avian 
influenza H5N1 since most may assume 
that microbiological safety cabinet is 
sterile following UV- light exposure. 
Further work is encouraged in the areas of 
laboratory and field assessment of the 
avian influenza H5N1 virus. 
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